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 Covering arrays have proven to be highly effective in detecting software bugs in what is 
known as combinatorial testing. A t-way covering array includes all t-way combinations of 
variable values, up to a specified level of t (usually 2-6 for software testing). In software systems 
that operate via a series of interactive inputs e.g. button clicks, a sequence covering array 
composed of sequences of events can be used. A t-way sequence covering array includes all t-
way permutations of events (events are not required to be adjacent). This research examines the 
effectiveness of using sequence covering arrays to discover software bugs in mobile phone 
applications. Analysis of the distribution of t-way interactions between events in event sequence 
bugs provides insight into the practicality and usefulness of this combinatorial testing method. 
From a developer’s perspective, these methods can contribute to finding this particular class of 
bugs early in the software development process, saving the developers time and money without 
sacrificing effectiveness. However, an attacker may also leverage these techniques to discover 
previously undetected bugs as a means to exploit the system. This method can be particularly 
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useful for attackers in that it is often simple to determine events in interactive software, even in 
black-box environments where internal knowledge about the source code is absent. Mobile 
applications running on popular operating systems such as Android and iOS are generally very 
interactive and therefore susceptible to these types of bugs. This project involved analyzing 
hundreds of software vulnerabilities in Android software, developing a new research tool for 
measuring sequence coverage in existing test suites, and using these combinatorial methods on 
various Android mobile applications. 
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NOMENCLATURE  
 
N   total number of tests 
n   total number of parameters in tests 
t   strength of covering array 
v   number of values for each parameter  
vi   number of values for parameter i 
CA(N, n, v, t)  t-way covering array of n parameters each with v values  
S   finite set of events represented as symbols 
SCA(N, S, t)  an N x |S| matrix where each t-way sequence of 𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 appears at least once 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
With the increasing threat of cyberattacks that governments, organizations, and 
individuals are experiencing each year, the call for more secure systems is louder than ever. A 
single flaw in the design, specification, or implementation of software can have costly 
consequences, and as a result there is a growing need for more proactive approaches in securing 
software. Advances in testing methodologies, software engineering practices, and vulnerability 
scanning has resulted in the decrease of severe software vulnerabilities being introduced into 
software, however, the overall number of vulnerabilities discovered each year is trending 
upwards [1].   
One of the challenges that comes with securing software involves testing the vast input 
space for a given application. When a system has a large number of inputs it becomes 
increasingly diﬃcult to test for correctness in all possible cases. Even with binary inputs, a 
modest number of parameters can make exhaustive testing intractable. Take for instance an 
encryption module with a 128 bit block size and a 256 bit key. To verify and validate the entire 
circuit would require testing 2384 total combinations of inputs. Granted the ability to test at a rate 
of one million tests per second, the sun would burn out long before the input space is exhausted. 
With software systems, the domain is often much larger since there are usually many ways to 
conﬁgure a system, along with testing all the input combinations for each conﬁguration. There 
also arises the issue of parameters having a much higher number of possible values rather than 
being constrained to binary inputs. This challenge alone is partly responsible for a large portion 
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of software vulnerabilities that exist in the wild today, as companies simply do not have the time 
or budget to test the entire input space of their systems.  
Combinatorial testing (CT) has proven to be a highly eﬀective method for testing 
complex software systems with large input spaces [2][3]. CT tests all t-way interactions between 
input parameters rather than exhaustively testing the entire system. This drastically reduces the 
number of tests for any given system, making it much more practical in real world scenarios. 
One area of combinatorial testing that has garnered attention recently is in the concept of 
sequence covering arrays (SCA). Kuhn, et al. ﬁrst proposed the sequence covering array in 2012, 
with the idea of ﬁnding bugs that are activated only after a speciﬁc sequence of events [4]. For 
example, suppose there exists a cloud based server application that accepts connections from 
diﬀerent clients, and loads their saved media content after authentication. A foreseeable problem 
could arise from a speciﬁc sequence such as when a user logs into the server, loads a file, and 
then logs out before the file is fully loaded. Several errors can be proposed in this scenario, e.g. if 
the server only closes a connection after receiving an acknowledgement from the client that the 
media content was received. In this case a denial of service attack could be initiated using this 
sequence over and over again with many clients. Software bugs such as these are unique since 
their propagation depends on an order of events rather than a speciﬁc combination of inputs into 
the system. Testing for sequences such as these appear to be of higher importance in more 
interactive systems such as web applications, mobile applications, etc., however sequences exist 
in many other systems as well.  
When testing software, it is sensible to use multiple methodologies in order to provide 
high quality code. Unit testing works well for test driven development, and stress testing can 
determine if the system can handle a copious workload, but both are necessary in their own right 
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to providing a stable system. Similarly, when searching for software vulnerabilities, several 
different attack vectors are often chained together in an attempt to get the system to behave in an 
unintended manner. Random large inputs are shoved into buffers, symbolic links are being 
altered, etc. sometimes simultaneously in hopes that the system will crash or output some 
information it’s not supposed to. In similar fashion, sequence covering arrays are eﬀective at 
triggering specific types of faults in software, however, when mixing SCA with other testing 
methods, one can uncover some very interesting security vulnerabilities.  
In vulnerability research, it is regularly the case that the system being probed is a black-
box. That is, the security researcher will have an idea of all the inputs and configurations feeding 
into the system, but will not have access to the actual blueprints i.e. source code, circuit 
schematics, etc. When faced with this challenge, various techniques are used to either try and 
better understand what is happening at the code level or to just try and cause a failure, e.g., 
reverse engineering and fuzzing. With many software systems, events can sometimes be deduced 
by simply sending inputs to the program or reading documentation on the architecture the 
software is running on (if available). For instance, consider commercial software running on 
Windows that connects to a URL provided as an input. Even if the source code is unavailable, 
one might be able to determine that the program is using the Winsock API or something similar 
for its TCP connections, and could decide that opening a socket, failing to open the socket, and 
closing the socket are all relevant events. Hackers may chain these events together in unexpected 
ways to produce the program failure they are looking for. If certain events are easy to determine 
without having much knowledge about the actual design of the system, then software developers 
would be wise to test for as many permutations of these events as possible. In the best case 
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scenario, developers will also test as many permutations of all events in the system, regardless of 
whether or not they can be determined in black-box scenarios.  
Research Problem 
The goal of this research project is to gauge the effectiveness of sequence covering arrays 
in discovering event sequence bugs in mobile applications. Particularly, in black-box 
environments where very little may be known about the underlying source code. In order to meet 
these goals, the following subproblems are explored: 
• identify the distribution of interaction strengths for software bugs propagated by 
event sequences 
• develop a tool that can measure the combinatorial coverage for existing event 
sequence test suites 
• perform black-box testing on mobile applications using sequence covering arrays 
Currently, there does not exist any data on the distribution of interaction strengths for 
event sequence bugs, nor are there many tools that support using sequence covering arrays in real 
world testing. By determining the upper-bound on the interaction strength of these bugs, 
software testers and vulnerability researchers can confidently decide the appropriate size of SCA 
to use for their scenario. There have been many significant studies on the t-way fault 
distributions in combinatorial interaction testing. Currently, combinatorial testing tools and 
covering array generators support values up to 𝑡 = 6, as these studies have shown this to be the 
upper bound. A distribution of event sequence bugs would allow new and existing tools to be 
modified to support the upper bound for sequence covering arrays. The existence of an SCA 
measurement tool would allow for testers to decide whether or not to use an existing test suite 
based on if it covers an appropriate amount of t-way combinations. Finally, a study of these 
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methods in practice will provide further insight into the practicality of using SCA in black-box 
scenarios.  
Solution 
 First, I analyze a collection of hundreds of software bug reports available from the NVD 
(National Vulnerability Database) and the Google Security Bulletin. Analysis includes studying 
the crash reports, code differentiation between the vulnerable code and non-vulnerable code 
fixes, and the interaction between events that propagated the bug. Gathering this information will 
lead to a distribution of t-way interaction strengths for these types of bugs. Furthermore, this 
distribution will contain an upper-bound for 𝑡, i.e. the highest strength sequence covering array 
for pseudo-exhaustive testing of sequences.  
 Second, these combinatorial testing methods are used in black-box environments. We 
select two different Android mobile applications and model sequence covering arrays after their 
events. Closed source 3rd party lock screens are chosen due to their inherent interactivity, as 
interactive software is believed to be more susceptible to event sequence bugs. Whether or not 
these methods are successful in finding newly undiscovered vulnerabilities will further determine 
if they should be used in real world scenarios.   
Lastly, I develop a command line tool written in Haskell for measuring the coverage of 
sequence test suites. This tool will allow testers to measure the effectiveness of their existing test 
suites for finding event sequence bugs and help them determine whether or not an SCA should 
be used instead. The tool was written in Haskell to facilitate rapid development with a minimal 
code base. The tool will be continued to be developed and could eventually be ported to existing 
combinatorial measurement tools that don’t yet measure for t-way interactions between events. 
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Contributions 
This work makes the following contributions: 
• The first ever distribution of t-way interactions between event sequence bugs is obtained. 
This distribution can be built upon as more and more software bug reports are analyzed. 
More bug reports should be analyzed in order to the further validate the upper-bound for 
t. If the value of t grows larger, e.g. t > 9, then the importance of efficient algorithms that 
can create large covering arrays also grows.  
• A study on the practicality of black-box event sequence testing on mobile applications is 
performed. To our knowledge, this is the first study on event sequence bug testing in 
black-box environments that can be found in literature.  
• The first ever tool for measuring the combinatorial coverage of event sequence test suites 
is developed. This tool will help facilitate using sequence covering arrays in real world 
software testing, as well as enable analysis of the benefit of switching to an SCA based 
test suite. 
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 CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND 
 
In this chapter we will discuss pertinent background information and related work in two 
main categories – combinatorial testing and Android mobile application security. Combinatorial 
testing requires the prerequisite knowledge of covering arrays, which will also be covered at the 
beginning of this chapter. All the background information covered here is related to the material 
that will be discussed in the remaining chapters of this thesis.  
Covering Arrays 
In mathematics, a covering array (CA) is an object that consists of all t-way combinations 
of variable values, up to a specified level of 𝑡. More formally, take the parameters 𝑛1, 𝑛2, … , 𝑛𝑘 
with domains 𝐷1, 𝐷2, … , 𝐷𝑘. Then for any 𝑡 domains, 𝐷𝑖 × 𝐷𝑗 × … × 𝐷𝑡 , there exists a row 𝑟 =
(𝑎1, 𝑎2, … , 𝑎𝑘) in the CA, with some t-tuple (𝑎𝑖, 𝑎𝑗, … , 𝑎𝑡) = 𝑇, for all 𝑇 ∈ 𝐷𝑖 × 𝐷𝑗 × … × 𝐷𝑡. 
Contrary to an orthogonal array, which requires that each t-way combination of inputs appear the 
same number of times, a covering array’s only stipulation is that each t-way combination appears 
at least once. Due to this leniency, covering arrays are much easier to construct than orthogonal 
arrays. In addition, a t-way covering array can always be found for any set of input variables and 
values. For some variable/value configurations, it is mathematically impossible to construct a t-
way orthogonal array. 
The “covering array number” is the number of rows that are associated with a given 
covering array. This number can be notated as CA(t,k,v) where 𝑡 is the strength of the array, 𝑘 is 
the number of parameters, and 𝑣 is the total number of possible values for each parameter [5]. 
For example, CA(2,4,2) is a 2-way covering array spanning 4 binary input parameters. The size 
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of a covering array is not fixed i.e. rows can be added, however, optimality is usually preferred. 
An optimal covering array, denoted CAN(t,k,v), minimizes the number of rows in the array while 
still meeting the criteria of covering all t-way combinations of parameters. A general solution for 
the size of optimal covering arrays is still unknown. Figure 1 shows an optimal 2-way covering 
array with parameters.  
 
0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 
1 1 0 1 
1 0 1 1 
1 1 1 0 
Figure 1. Optimal 2-way Covering Array 
 
For the covering array above, take a selection of any two columns, and every 
combination of 0 and 1 will be present (00, 01, 10, 11). The compactness of the covering array is 
what makes it useful. In only five rows, all twenty-four 2-way combinations of parameter values 
are covered. If we were to exhaustively cover all combinations of the parameters, sixteen rows 
would be needed. The relationship between covering array size and (𝑡, 𝑘, 𝑣) depends on the 
algorithm used to construct the covering array. Existing algorithms used in practice construct 
covering arrays that grow exponentially to 𝑡, but logarithmically to 𝑘. 
 
Covering array size ∝ 𝑣𝑡log (𝑛) 
 
It should be noted that it is possible to create mixed strength covering arrays as well, i.e. a 
covering array in which each parameter contains a diﬀerent number of values. This is useful in 
practice since most systems contain more complex inputs such as alpha-numeric sequences. The 
total number of t-way combinations of inputs for such systems follow the equation: 
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∑ 𝑣𝑖 × 𝑣𝑗 × … × 𝑣𝑡
𝑛
𝑖≠𝑗≠⋯≠𝑡
 
, ∀ (
𝑛
𝑡
)  combinations of parameters 
 
where 𝑣𝑖 is the number of possible values for parameter i, and n is the number of parameters in 
the system. The summation is over all (𝑛
𝑡
) combinations of parameters in the system.  
Combinatorial Testing 
 The power of covering arrays become apparent when constructing test suites for large 
software systems. With any piece of large software, testing all combinations of inputs quickly 
becomes intractable. In certain life-critical situations, having high confidence that the software 
will not fail is imperative. Consider an autonomous vehicle transporting human passengers. As it 
is traveling down the highway at 60 miles per hour, a software failure in the collision avoidance 
system could cause serious injury or even the loss of life. But how can the engineers ever have 
high confidence that the system will not fail if they are only able to test a small fraction of the 
possible inputs? Combinatorial testing aims to solve this problem by choosing specific test cases 
which are statistically more likely to trigger the bugs, if any, that are present in the software.  
 Previous research has analyzed thousands of software bug reports from various software 
systems to determine a distribution of the interaction strength in software bugs. Specifically, how 
many parameters contribute to the fault propagation of a given bug. Empirical evidence gleaned 
from the analysis suggests the interaction rule. That is, most software failures are caused by one 
or two factors, with progressively fewer caused by 3 or more factors [2]. Figure 2 illustrates the 
interaction rule and demonstrates how covering arrays could be useful in software testing. 
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Interaction Rule: Most failures are induced by single factor faults or by the joint combinatorial 
effect (interaction) of two factors, with progressively fewer failures induced by interactions 
between three or more factors.  
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of t-way faults 
 
 Out of all the software bugs analyzed, no failure was induced by a more than 6 factor 
fault [2][6]. Furthermore, high confidence in finding most software bugs can be achieved by 
testing for all 4-way combinations of input parameters. Based on this finding, combinatorial 
testing proposes to use t-way covering arrays modeled after the system as test suites. Since 6-
way covering arrays would be sufficient for finding all of the software bugs from those analyzed 
in past studies, software testers can have high confidence in finding all the software bugs in a 
system when using covering arrays of similar strength, with an appropriate input model that uses 
representative values for variables with large domains (discussed below).  
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 Consider a simple mobile phone application which can run on both iOS and Android. 
Let’s suppose the application is used for taking and sharing photos with social media friends. 
The application may have several different inputs during runtime e.g. description of a photo, 
phone number, username, etc. However, assume a scenario where the developers want to ensure 
that the application functions correctly in all configurations of the system. In the real world, the 
total configurations is likely very large and complex, but a simple example will be used here. 
Table 1 shows the various configurations for the application in this scenario. 
 
Table 1. Application Configuration Example 
Platform hasCamera acceptedContactsPermission lowBattery numberOfFriends 
Android 5.1 true true true 0 to 231 − 2 
Android 7.0 false false false 231 + 1 to -1 
…    231 − 1 
iOS    231 
 
Notice that the numberOfFriends configuration parameter only contains four possible range 
values, rather than all the integer values that it could actually take. Reducing the input space only 
to values that are logically different i.e. cause the path of execution to change, is common in 
software testing. The resulting ranges are known as equivalence classes, and any value within a 
given equivalence class is assumed to have the same effect on execution as other values within 
the same class.  
Now, assume there are a total of 10 different platforms that the application is intended to 
run on. This yields 10 × 23 × 4 = 320 different system configurations. The only way to actually 
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ensure that the system functions correctly in all cases is to test all 320 configurations. However, 
the developers may come to the conclusion that testing every 2-way combination of 
configuration parameter will be sufficient for their purposes. Current combinatorial testing tools 
can generate 2-way covering arrays of this system with fewer than 100 rows, reducing the 
number of tests by more than 220! In practice, the reduction in the number of tests when using t-
way covering arrays is often much more drastic, resulting in a significant amount of savings on 
time and money during testing.  
Sequence Covering Arrays & Event Sequence Testing 
 Combinatorial testing methods have proven to be effective in finding software bugs in 
various systems. However, the methods described in the previous section are not useful when 
trying to detect software bugs that propagate via a series of events. Using our mobile application 
example from the last section, let’s suppose the application fails when a user attempts to share a 
photo after denying the application the necessary permissions it needs to access the user’s 
contacts. Simply setting the acceptedContactsPermission parameter to false is not enough to 
trigger the failure, since a particular order of events is required.  
 When a particular order of events in software can cause failures, a different type of 
covering array is needed for combinatorial testing. Kuhn, et. al proposed the sequence covering 
array in 2012 as a means for detecting these event sequence bugs [4]. Sequence covering arrays 
differ from ordinary covering arrays in that they are defined as an N x S matrix where entries are 
from a finite set S of s symbols, such that every t-length permutation of symbols from S occurs in 
at least one row. Furthermore, the t symbols in the permutation are not required to be adjacent. In 
software, events typically lead to some change in state. A later failure may depend on whether or 
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not that state in the program has previously been reached, but not necessarily immediately before 
the failure-triggering event.   
For example, consider the events a,b,c,d, and e. There are 5! = 120 permutations of these 
events. However, Figure 3 shows that all 2-way permutations of events can be covered in only 
two tests. 
 
a b c d e 
e d c b a 
Figure 3. 2-way sequence covering array 
 
Pick any two events from the set 𝑆 ≔ {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒}, and both permutations of those events are 
present within the SCA in Figure 3. Indeed, for any set of events, the optimal 2-way sequence 
covering array only contains two tests: the set of events, and the reverse order of this set. 
However, more intelligent algorithms are needed for generating t-way sequence covering arrays 
with 𝑡 > 2. Figure 4 below shows a 3-way sequence covering array for the same set of events.  
 
a b c d e 
e d c b a 
c d e a b 
b a e d c 
d a c b e 
e b c a d 
c a e b d 
d b e a c 
a e d c b 
b c d e a 
Figure 4. 3-way sequence covering array 
 
19 
 
Now pick any two events from the set 𝑆 ≔ {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒}, and all 3! = 6 permutations of events 
will be present within the SCA. For instance, abc, acb, bac, bca, cab, and cba are in tests 
1,5,4,6,3, and 2 respectively.  
Android Activity Lifecycle 
 Understanding various aspects of the Android operating system as well as how individual 
Android applications are constructed will be useful during test suite generation. Having 
considered events at the operating system level and how they can affect a top level application 
will allow for a much more robust system model. In Android, the basic building block for an 
interactive application is the “Activity,” which provides several callback methods that monitor 
and react to its own state. This section will examine the Android Activity lifecycle and discuss 
how the transitions through this lifecycle are useful when modeling application events. 
The Android Activity lifecycle consists of seven different callback methods that are 
called as the state of the activity changes [7].  
• onCreate – called when the system first creates the activity; includes basic 
application start up logic that is only called once throughout the activity life cycle 
• onStart – called when the activity first starts; prepares the activity to be presented 
to the user and often contains initializations for code that maintains the user 
interface 
• onResume – called when the activity enters the foreground; the user is interacting 
with the activity when it is in this state 
• onPause – called when there is some indication that the user is leaving the 
activity i.e. if the activity moves out of focus; code that manages and releases 
system resources is often included in this callback 
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• onStop – called when the activity is no longer visible to the user e.g. when a user 
multitasks and moves a separate application’s activity to the top of the activity 
stack; this callback will generally include more CPU intensive operations such as 
saving data to a database before the application is destroyed 
• onRestart – called first when the activity is recovered after entering the onStop 
callback 
• onDestroy – final call before the application is destroyed; only called once 
These callback methods generally contain some sort of side effect such as data 
initialization, garbage collection, etc. For this reason, the Android Activity lifecycle can be 
included in our system model of events with each callback method representing a different event 
in the system. In chapter 3, we will see that it may not be necessary to explicitly include these 
callback methods as events if they are already implicitly included in our test suite.   
Reverse Engineering Android Applications 
 The term “black-box” implies not knowing anything about the internal workings of a 
system. The inputs and outputs of the system are known, however, how the inputs are 
manipulated to produce the given output is a mystery. Hackers and security professionals alike 
are often faced with this problem, and several techniques are used as a means to gain insight into 
the core processes of the system. If the software is easy to reverse engineer, then not having the 
source code becomes trivial.  
 Software programmed in Java and compiled with the Java compiler are notoriously easy 
to reverse engineer. Many disassemblers exist that can produce a near perfect recreation of the 
original source code from Java bytecode. From a hacker’s perspective, this means having access 
to the .jar file alone is usually enough to go from a black-box scenario to a more favorable white-
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box scenario. Although obfuscation techniques can be employed in the source, given enough 
time and motivation, a reverse engineer will be able to deduce the underlying logic.   
 Most Android applications are programmed using the Java programming language. 
However, the compilation process is slightly different on the Android platform. Java code is first 
compiled into Java bytecode using the Javac compiler. This bytecode is then converted to DEX 
(Dalvik Executable) code, using the Android DX compiler. DEX code is similar to Java bytecode 
in that both are executed by a virtual machine, however, DEX code runs on the Dalvik VM, 
whereas Java bytecode is executed on the Java VM. There were several reasons for Android 
deciding to use their own version of a Java virtual machine that won’t be discussed here, but it 
essentially boils down to memory and processing constraints on mobile devices. From a reverse 
engineering perspective, disassembling DEX code into a near perfect representation of the 
original source code is not much different.  
 Recently, the Android platform switched from the Dalvik virtual machine to ART 
(Android RunTime). ART brought significant improvements, specifically in how applications are 
executed. Instead of using Just-in-time (JIT) compilation (the Dalvik VM coverts DEX code to 
machine code at runtime), ART uses Ahead-of-time (AOT) compilation (the DEX code is 
converted to native machine code just once upon install). This speeds up execution of 
applications, primarily during startup. The switch doesn’t affect the disassembly process 
however, since the original DEX code is included in the new ART .oat files.  
 So if it is fairly simple to reverse engineer Android applications, why do we focus on 
black-box scenarios in this research? First, the insight gained from this research will apply to 
other areas in mobile security such as testing iOS applications. Second, we believe that new 
techniques in obfuscation and other advances on the Android platform will continue to make 
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reverse engineering more difficult and time consuming, therefore prolonging the vulnerability 
discovery process. Lastly, there are several scenarios where reverse engineering the Android 
application provides little to no clues about the underlying logic. For instance, to defend against 
reverse engineering, some developers are moving what used to be client-side computations over 
to a server. In this case, the system as a whole (the Android application and the server 
application) are a black-box that cannot be completely reversed.  
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
 
In order to gauge the effectiveness of using a combinatorial test suite design to trigger 
event sequence bugs in software, the distribution of interaction strengths needed to be 
determined. For instance, if it was discovered that the upper bound on the interaction strength of 
an event sequence bug was eight, then an 8-way sequence covering array would be needed to 
provide high assurance during testing. This distribution would be provided by analyzing a large 
amount of software bug reports from different vulnerability databases. Furthermore, two separate 
3rd party Android applications are tested using sequence covering arrays. The applications tested 
were first modeled based on the observed events within the application, and then several 
constraints were removed in order to accommodate lazy SCA generation e.g. ignoring adjacent 
events. The effectiveness of this approach is discussed more in Chapter 4. Lastly, we develop a 
combinatorial coverage measurement tool for event sequences, CSCM (Combinatorial Sequence 
Coverage Measurement). The performance of this tool is evaluated by measuring several 
practical sized test suites.   
Android Vulnerability Analysis 
The Android Security Bulletin is a monthly bulletin dedicated to providing the latest 
information on security patches for the Android Open Source Project (AOSP), the Linux kernel 
used in Android, and other driver software present on Android devices [8]. Android device and 
chipset manufacturers also keep bulletins of various security patches that they apply to their 
proprietary software, and the Android Security Bulletin will generally contain links for more 
information on these patches as well. Each month a new bulletin is released, describing the fixes 
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that have been implemented for newly discovered vulnerabilities. Note that this vulnerability 
database does not include vulnerabilities from 3rd party applications like ones that could be 
downloaded from the Google Play Store, but instead only contains information and 
vulnerabilities pertaining to pre-installed applications i.e. system applications that are part of the 
Android operating system, or pre-installed device manufacturer applications. Nonetheless, the 
Android Security Bulletin contains thousands of patched software vulnerabilities, often with 
vivid descriptions of the vulnerability itself, and the source code changes that were implemented 
to apply the fix. Using the description of the vulnerability along with the changes that are 
reported in the source code, we can generally make a confident assessment in the type of bug we 
are analyzing e.g. event sequence bug, memory corruption, etc. along with the various factors 
that contribute to its propagation.  
Another useful vulnerability database is the United States National Vulnerability 
Database (NVD) operated by the Information Technology Laboratory at the National Institute of 
Standards & Technology (NIST). The NVD contains an abundance of information regarding 
software flaws, misconfigurations, product descriptions, and impact metrics for numerous 
products, including the Android Operating System [9]. The database is populated by CVE 
(Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures) which is a list of vulnerabilities, each containing an 
identification number, public references, and description of the flaw. CVE defines a vulnerability 
as “a weakness in the computational logic (e.g., code) found in software and hardware 
components that, when exploited, results in a negative impact to confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability. Mitigation of the vulnerabilities in this context typically involves coding changes, 
but could also include specification changes or even specification deprecations (e.g., removal of 
affected protocols or functionality in their entirety)” [10]. By this definition, what a developer 
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might characterize as a software bug, may not be characterized as a software vulnerability and 
therefore wouldn’t be listed in the NVD. For instance, consider a software flaw that incorrectly 
formatted text at the top of a mobile application. Although this may be considered a bug that 
needs a fix by the developers, it doesn’t actually constitute a negative impact to confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability. However, take the same scenario, except now the bug inadvertently 
displays the user’s credentials on the screen. This would be considered a vulnerability, and 
depending on the product, may get its own CVE.  
All of the software vulnerabilities listed in the Android Security Bulletin are also listed in 
the National Vulnerability Database. However, both databases were used as the NVD often 
contained links to other sources that were useful. Frequently, it was the case that both databases 
contained insufficient information to properly determine the vulnerability’s propagation. Even 
with the source code changes in hand, without expert knowledge of the underlying component or 
a more detailed description of the vulnerability, it was often too difficult to make an accurate 
assessment of how one might trigger the failure. Some vulnerabilities contained multiple sources 
outside of the Android Security Bulletin and NVD, describing their propagation and exploitation. 
These sources were also considered during our analysis, however, much more weight was given 
to descriptions in the bug databases as they are verified by the Android security team. The 
internet presence of proofs of concept for different vulnerabilities were in large part the main 
factor in determining the validity of these outside sources. That is, if an exploitable bug 
contained multiple proofs of concept and supporting descriptions from different sources outside 
the Android Security Bulletin and NVD, then we were more likely to consider the information 
from the outside sources. However, if a specific vulnerability had a smaller internet presence i.e. 
26 
 
one un-verifiable proof of concept, then only the descriptions from the Android Security Bulletin 
and NVD would be considered.  
The distinction between vulnerability and bug has been made, but we should also 
emphasize that the vulnerabilities that we are considering are those that can be discovered via 
event sequences, but not strictly caused by event sequence bugs. Vulnerabilities may exist 
without the presence of a bug e.g. a system can be implemented perfectly according to 
specification, but this does not mean that it is free from negative impact on the confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability of the system. In the context of this research, a vulnerability may be 
discovered by a particular event sequence, without the presence of an event sequence bug. 
Consider an FTP application that stores the plaintext passwords in a text file on the system. This 
may be exactly what the developers had in mind, and therefore it wouldn’t be considered a bug, 
however, it is considered a vulnerability. From a black-box testing perspective, if we can 
discover this vulnerability via a particular sequence of events, then we will account for the 
interaction strength in our distribution. There are two reasons behind including these 
vulnerabilities in our distribution of event sequence bugs. First, is that most vulnerabilities of this 
type are eventually considered design or specification bugs, i.e., there was a flaw in the way the 
system was originally specified to behave. Second, from a black-box testing perspective, this is 
usually the exact type of thing a tester or hacker is looking for.  
 The software vulnerabilities we decided to analyze were all the vulnerabilities listed in 
the Android Security Bulletin from August 2015 to December 2017, excluding those pertaining 
to device or chipset manufacturers. An example of such a vulnerability is CVE-2016-2457. This 
particular CVE entry existed in the WiFi module and was described as an elevation of privilege 
vulnerability: “An elevation of privilege vulnerability in Wi-Fi could enable a guest account to 
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modify the Wi-Fi settings that persist for the primary user. This issue is rated as Moderate 
severity because it enables local access to ‘dangerous’ capabilities without permission”. From 
the description alone, one might be able to deduce that running a specific sequence of three 
events would find this vulnerability: 
1. Switch to guest account 
2. Modify Wi-Fi settings 
3. Switch back to the primary user 
Execution of these events in order would allow a tester to discover the dangerous vulnerability. 
Note that these events are not required to be executed immediately after one another. If this were 
the case, then the construction of our test cases would be much more restricted and sequence 
covering arrays would not suffice (as sequence covering arrays do not require the events be 
adjacent). When analyzing the software bugs, we were sure to make this distinction so that the 
actual effectiveness of using sequence covering arrays could be determined. CVE-2016-2457 
was decided to have an interaction strength of 3 – that is, a 3-way sequence covering array would 
trigger the sequence of events needed to discover the vulnerability. More often than not, the 
description is not enough to make a confident analysis of the vulnerability. In the case of this 
vulnerability much more information was also provided in the change log, along with the source 
code differentials. Figure 5 shows a short example of what one might expect to see in the change 
log for a given bug on the Android Security Bulletin. 
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Figure 5. CVE-2016-2457 Change log 
 
Although it may not seem like much information, we can deduce what events would discover the 
vulnerability if it still existed by examining the test cases used in verifying the fix. In the first test 
case it states “Flashed device, switched to existing guest user, and verified that Wifi settings are 
disabled.” From this description, we can see that the developers likely did not intend for WiFi 
settings to be available for guest users, as this option was completely disabled in the fix. 
Furthermore, a quick survey of the source code changes in Figure 6 show the new restriction on 
guest accounts: 
 
Figure 6. CVE-2016-2457 Code Differential Snippet 
 
Whether or not this was a specification bug or an implementation bug is not known, which 
brings up an important point in our discussion on event interaction classification. If it is an 
implementation bug (i.e. the developers originally allowed WiFi settings on guest accounts, but 
[DO NOT MERGE] Disallow guest user from changing Wifi settings 
 
Disallow existing and newly created guest users from 
changing Wifi settings. 
 
BUG: 27411179 
TEST: Flashed device, switched to existing guest user, and verified 
      that Wifi settings are disabled. 
TEST: Flashed device, created new guest user, and verified that Wifi 
      settings are disabled. 
         if (mGuestRestrictions.isEmpty()) { 
             mGuestRestrictions.putBoolean(UserManager.DISALLOW_OUTGOING_CALLS, true); 
             mGuestRestrictions.putBoolean(UserManager.DISALLOW_SMS, true); 
+            mGuestRestrictions.putBoolean(UserManager.DISALLOW_CONFIG_WIFI, true); 
         } 
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didn’t want the changes to persist upon switching accounts), then the 3-way sequence covering 
array would be needed for vulnerability discovery. However, if it is a specification bug (i.e. the 
specification did not correctly state that WiFi should be disabled completely on guest accounts), 
then only two events would be needed to find the flaw: 1.) switch to guest account, 2.) access 
WiFi settings. In these types of scenarios, re-examining the actual vulnerability details is helpful. 
Is the vulnerability the issue of guest users having access to WiFi settings? Rather, is it that the 
guest user has the ability to modify the WiFi settings of other accounts on the system? For this 
vulnerability, we consider the latter to be the correct choice as the original description of the 
vulnerability describes it as a privilege escalation. In other analysis where too much ambiguity is 
involved to make a confident decision, we take the interaction strength to be the upper bound of 
the choices. By choosing the upper bound we can ensure that testing based on this data will use 
sufficiently long t-way sequences.  
 Several vulnerabilities analyzed had more complex characteristics pertaining to the event 
sequences that caused them. CVE-2015-6643, was described as being a factory reset protection 
bypass in the setup wizard. Factory Reset Protection (FRP) was employed in Android to prevent 
access to stolen devices via prompting the user to enter the password associated with the Google 
account on the device, before performing a factory reset. In many cases where mobile devices 
are stolen, the phone is rendered useless due to a screen lock that prevents the criminal from 
accessing the device. If access is not prevented, the FRP mechanism deters the criminals by 
preventing factory resets which wipe the phone’s memory completely. A primary motivator for 
stealing mobile phones is selling the device for money. Modern day cell phones can range 
upward in prices of $900 to $1,000+, which is a huge incentive for criminals. However, many 
people will refrain from buying devices that appear to be stolen, even at large discounts. Since 
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the owner’s data cannot be removed from the phone without knowing the password that was last 
used to access the device, making the phone appear brand new becomes a challenge. The FRP 
bypass exploit was achieved via a sequence of events in the setup wizard: 
1. hit button to access Google keyboard settings (this is usually achieved by holding down 
the '@' or ',' keys) 
2. Select "Help & Feedback" 
3. Long press on any text on the screen (this brings up another dialog) 
4. Click "Search" and search for “settings” 
5. Now in the settings menu, click "About Phone" 
6. Tap the "Build number" icon several times to enable developer options 
7. Go to developer options and disable FRP (OEM unlocking) to factory reset device 
without FRP 
In this case, the vulnerability was fixed by disallowing text search in the setup wizard (step 4). 
Although the exploitation required seven steps, the actual vulnerability (allowing access to the 
settings) occurred after only four steps. Furthermore, a 4-way sequence covering array may not 
be useful here since most of the events are adjacent i.e. can only be exercised immediately 
following another event. For instance, selecting “Help & Feedback” can only be exercised after 
accessing the google keyboard settings. We will discuss in the next section a lazy method for 
dealing with adjacent events in which a 4-way SCA would suffice for discovering this 
vulnerability.  
 Admittedly, vulnerabilities such as CVE-2015-6643 are inherently more difficult to 
discover even with sequence covering arrays. The vulnerability appears to be introduced by the 
developers not knowing that the settings could be accessed from the keyboard. This could be due 
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to several factors such as one team working on the keyboard functionality, and another team 
working on the setup wizard functionality. The setup wizard team may not be aware of the full 
specifications of the keyboard software and therefore wouldn’t know of all the possible events. 
Knowing of the existence of all possible events in the software is critical in the construction of 
sequence covering arrays.  
 One last example of the analysis conducted in this research will demonstrate a 
vulnerability that is not classified as being caused by event sequences. Often times we found that 
event sequences may be involved, however, the root cause of the vulnerability was due to 
improper handling of data. If data is also involved in the bug / vulnerability propagation, then a 
sequence covering array alone would not be sufficient in discovering it. CVE-2017-0593 is 
described as a privilege escalation vulnerability in the Framework APIs. A comment in the code 
describes the fix as well as the initial cause of the vulnerability: “Prevent apps to change 
permission protection level to dangerous from any other type as this would allow a privilege 
escalation where an app adds a normal permission in other app's group and then redefines it as 
dangerous leading to the group auto-grant.” Several events are listed here and further analysis of 
the source code is needed for proper classification. However, from this comment alone we can 
see that part of the issue is caused by the actions “change permission” and “redefine permission.” 
Although a tester could generate an SCA based on such events, specifying these alone would not 
be adequate, as it is the actual data (permission type) that is the origin of the vulnerability. For 
example, the comment states that the permission change must be from any type to the specific 
“dangerous” permission type. So changing permissions to any type other than “dangerous” 
would not contribute to the vulnerability’s propagation. Events could be defined such as 
changePermissionToDangerous, however, if a large number of permissions existed, then this 
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would be extremely impractical to do for all of them. For this reason, vulnerabilities such as this 
were not considered in our analysis. 
Black-box Testing 3rd Party Android Applications 
 Analyzing the distribution of interaction strengths between event sequence bugs provides 
valuable insight into whether or not sequence covering arrays are a viable option for bug 
discovery. Testing the effectiveness of SCA in actual black-box scenarios would help further 
gauge the practicality of this technique. This process would involve selecting a couple of closed 
source 3rd party Android applications and generating test suites modeled after the system’s 
events. In chapter 2 we discussed the simplicity of reverse engineering many Android 
applications, however, no such attempts were made on the applications chosen, both for legal 
reasons as well as preserving the black-box environments needed for this research.  
 After analyzing several of the vulnerability reports in the Android Security Bulletin, 
access control seemed to be an interesting area of application functionality to experiment with. 
Several of the software vulnerabilities such as CVE-2015-6643 bypassed access restrictions 
simply by exercising a series of events. Since many of these vulnerabilities were present in the 
Android system itself, we would expect several 3rd party application software to make similar 
mistakes. Many applications aren’t actively developed and may contain security vulnerabilities 
uncovered from the newest techniques in vulnerability research. Furthermore, some applications 
are fairly new and will not have been scrupulously tested by a large userbase. 
 The specific type of application we focused on were 3rd party lock screens. 
Vulnerabilities in these applications have serious implications for the overall security of the 
system. If a lock screen application is bypassed by an attacker with physical access to the device, 
the entire system can be compromised. Since security is the main functionality that should be 
33 
 
provided by a lock screen, exploiting this feature can have a very negative impact on the overall 
perception of the software. When a user installs a 3rd party lock screen application, the additional 
functionality of the app is what is generally most appealing. For instance, many of these 
applications will include several different widgets, tools, or background designs that can be 
accessed from the lock screen, which are not available on the stock Android lock screen. 
However, when a user downloads this software, they will expect the same level of security that 
the stock version supplies.  
 Since the Android operating system runs on a wide variety of devices from various 
manufacturers, it is expected that certain event sequence bugs will be present on some devices 
but may not be present on others. The same holds for various versions of the Android OS. For 
instance, Android 7.0 includes the ability to call an emergency contact from the lock screen, 
however, Android 5.1.1 does not include this functionality. From a developer’s perspective, 
these events may not be accounted for if the application hasn’t been updated to run on the latest 
version of Android. For this research, we decided to use three different phone models running 
different versions of the Android operating system. The devices we used for testing the chosen 
3rd Party lock screen applications are listed below. 
• Sony Xperia Z1 (Android 5.1.1) 
• Google Nexus 6P (Android 7.0) 
• Sony Xperia XZ Premium (Android 8.0) 
 The first application we chose to perform testing on was the Microsoft Next Lock Screen. 
The Microsoft website says the following about the application: “Next Lock Screen is the 
ultimate lock screen for busy professionals. Next helps protect your phone from unwanted access 
by others, and you are instantly more productive. It is an excellent productivity locker app and 
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companion for your everyday life” [12]. The Google Play Store listing also lists several 
accolades for the software such as AndroidPIT’s 2016 “Best Lock Screen for Android” award. 
Although Microsoft Next has over 1 million installs and appears to be a popular choice among 
users looking for an alternative lock screen, the last update occurred over one year ago, leading 
us to believe that it is not currently in active development. Nonetheless, the app has several 
notable features that would be appealing to users looking for an alternative lock screen solution. 
• Custom unlocking via a PIN or pattern  
• View missed calls, text messages, and notifications from popular social media websites 
• Launching applications with a built in launcher straight from the lock screen 
• Quick access to tools such as the camera, flashlight, WiFi, Bluetooth, and more 
 There are several events that can occur within the context of the Microsoft Next Lock 
Screen. Modeling our test suite to include every event possible will improve our ability to find 
new bugs and vulnerabilities. A quick glance at the user interface of the lock screen application 
gives clues as to what actions are available to be performed. As shown in Figure 7 below, there 
appears to be functionality for recovering a forgotten PIN / Pattern as well as opening the 
camera. This information is obtained simply by observation and shows the little amount of effort 
involved in identifying events within interactive software.  
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Figure 7. Microsoft Next Lock Screen Application 
   
Some events within the Microsoft Next Lock Screen are not apparent by observation, but 
are instead system wide events offered by the Android operating system. For instance, many 
versions of Android come with the ability to activate the Google Assistant by speaking the 
phrase “OK Google.” The Google Assistant software can turn on the device’s flashlight, perform 
web searches, call contacts in the user’s phonebook, etc. Events such as these can have serious 
security implications if not handled properly by lock screen applications, so we will include them 
in our test suite. Figure 8 below lists all of the events of interest we have identified for this lock 
screen.  
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Event Description 
A Push soft camera button 
B Push hardware camera button 
C Voice activate google assistant 
D 
Activate google assistant via home button 
long press 
E Enter Pin 
F Change wallpaper 
G Send forgot PIN/Pattern email 
H Click Widget shortcuts 
I Take screenshot 
J Notification bar settings button 
 K Accept Phone Call 
Figure 8. Events of interest in the Microsoft Next Lock Screen Application 
 
 The events in Figure 8 are fairly general. In practice, they may be as abstract as needed to 
test any given functionality. As indicated in chapter 2, Android activities contain several 
different callback functions that are called during different stages of the activity lifecycle. If we 
wanted to include the onResume function for the main activity of the Microsoft Next Lock 
Screen, we could list it as an event in our table as well. Often these Android activity functions 
are indirectly included in our sequence covering array as we transition between executing the 
various events. For instance, if “hit multitask button” is an event, then every time we execute this 
action, the activity’s onPause function will also be called (since onPause is called every time an 
activity is no longer in focus in the foreground). When we return to the activity, the onResume 
function will be called as a result.  
 As mentioned earlier, some of these events are only available on certain versions of the 
Android operating system as well as certain devices. Open camera via hardware button would 
not be available on the Google Nexus 6P, so we would ignore this event when testing on that 
device. Separate sequence covering arrays can be generated based on which system is being 
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tested. Using the combinatorial sequence test generator tool developed by NIST, we constructed 
a 4-way sequence covering array based on the above events. This was the maximum size SCA 
offered by the NIST tool, and the overhead incurred by generating a 4-way SCA versus a 3-way 
SCA is negligible in this system model.  
 Note that previous studies have shown sound methods of modeling interactive systems, 
specifically for generating t-way test suites for event sequences [11]. Since there are many 
caveats when considering event sequences (adjacent events, constraints, etc.), these methods are 
needed for an accurate constructions of test suites. However, we are approaching this research 
from a black-box perspective, and will instead use a lazy approach that uses the least amount of 
knowledge about the system as possible for test suite generation. The lazy approach only 
considers independent events from the context of the current activity, and excludes transitions. 
For example, if the camera can be opened from screen A, and it can also be opened from screen 
B, these will be treated as two separate events. Overall, this greatly increases the number of 
events in our system model, however, since covering array size only grows logarithmically to the 
number of events, the resulting increase in sequence covering array size is small. Furthermore, 
consider the following: 
• A system containing events a,b,c,d 
• b can only be executed after a 
Now suppose that a 3-way SCA is generated which includes the test b,c,a,d. Since event b cannot 
be executed until after event a, the test can be modified to be: a,b,c,a,d. Note, that event a is 
executed twice in this test, but it fixes the constraint violation we faced with minimal effort. In 
practice, our tests may contain many constraint violations and this method can greatly increase 
the average length of our tests.   
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 The second Android lock screen application tested during this research is Super Locker. 
The popularity of this lock screen was the primary reason for choosing it in our tests. With over 
5 million downloads, and nearly 50,000 reviews, the application is one of the most downloaded 
lock screens in the Google Play Store. Super Locker also appears to be in active development as 
the last update occurred just one week before downloading it for testing. Although there are 
several lock screen applications that we could have chosen, Super Locker offered a wide variety 
of features such as a music control center, weather widgets, and camera access [13]. A lock 
screen with many features would likely be more exciting as there is a larger set of event 
sequences that can occur.  
 Modeling the Super Locker application followed the same observational process that was 
used when modeling the Microsoft Next Lock Screen. There were a few more notable events that 
are available within the Super Locker application, however. For instance, the application 
contains a “boost” button which will free system resources that are slowing down the phone. 
Advertisements, widgets, weather, and music also appear in a scrollable window that is 
accessible from the lock screen. One of the more interesting differences between Microsoft Next 
and Super Locker, is that Super Locker supports making emergency calls from the lock screen. 
Figure 9 on the next page displays the events of interest in the Super Locker application. 
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Event Description 
A Push soft camera button 
B Push hardware camera button 
C Voice activate google assistant 
D 
Activate google assistant via home button 
long press 
E Select Application Widget 
F Click Advertisement 
G Boost Device 
H Enter Pin 
I Emergency Call 
J Notification bar settings button 
K Take Screenshot 
L Receive phone call 
Figure 9. Events of interest in the Super Locker Lock Screen  
  
Earlier in the chapter, we mentioned that events would be independent and considered in 
the context of each activity. This would mean that event B could be labeled as multiple events 
(push hardware camera button from lock screen, push hardware camera button from news feed, 
etc). However, in this case it makes sense to label the “push hardware camera button” as a single 
independent event, since it can occur from every state in the program i.e. there are no constraints 
on the event. Now consider event A. Opening the camera via the soft camera button can only 
occur from the main activity in the lock screen, so this is the only event corresponding to the soft 
camera button. However, if the soft camera button appeared on multiple screens (but not all), 
each would be labeled as separate events.  
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CSCM Tool 
 Several tools exist that help facilitate combinatorial testing in practice. For this research, 
we generated sequence covering arrays using the NIST sequence covering array generator tool. 
Other tools such as ACTS (Automated Combinatorial Testing for Software) are used for 
generating ordinary covering arrays for interaction testing, while tools such as CCM 
(Combinatorial Coverage Measurement) measures the coverage of these generated test suites. 
Currently, there does not exist a tool for measuring the combinatorial coverage of sequences in 
test suites. This research aimed to develop such a tool which would be useful for event sequence 
testing as well as comparing sequence covering array generation algorithms.  
 The Haskell programming language was used to develop CSCM (Combinatorial 
Sequence Coverage Measurement). Haskell is a pure, functional programming language that 
required a minimal amount of source code and enabled rapid development. Many libraries exist 
with efficient algorithms for creating permutations, sorting lists, removing duplicate elements, 
etc. Counting t-way sequences can be computationally intensive, especially for large test suites 
with long tests (20+ events per test), so parallel processing was needed for eliminating many 
bottlenecks. For instance, each test contains 𝑘 number of t-way sequences, and counting these 
subsequences can be performed in parallel since they are independent of each other. Performance 
metrics for the CSCM tool are presented at the end of chapter 4 and highlight the performance 
boost that is incurred when utilizing multiple processors.  
 The algorithm for computing t-way coverage is quite simple, and most of the challenges 
in developing the CSCM tool were in computational complexity. Below are the general steps 
involved with creating any sequence coverage measurement tool: 
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1. Count the total number of t-way sequences for a given set of events 𝐸. 
𝑒 = (
|𝐸|
𝑡
) × 𝑡! 
2. For each row in the test suite, store the t-way subsequences in an array.  
3. Remove all duplicates from the array yielding the total number of unique t-way 
sequences in the test suite, k. 
4. Divide the unique number of t-way subsequences in the test suite by the total number of 
possible t-way subsequences. 
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 =
𝑘
𝑒
 
 This general algorithm was used when developing CSCM, however, step 2 is performed 
in parallel if the user has multiple cores available. The other bottleneck that exists is in step 3, 
which has complexity 𝑂(𝑛2), however, we achieved 𝑂(𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑛)) complexity utilizing an 
ordered list implementation available in the Data.List Haskell package.  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS & IMPLICATIONS 
  
 In this chapter will discuss the results from our three experiments. Mainly, the 
distribution that was obtained via analyzing event sequence bugs in Android, the black-box 
testing results on 3rd party lock screen applications, as well as the performance of our newly 
developed combinatorial sequence coverage measurement tool. The implications of such results 
will be discussed here in detail. 
Vulnerability Analysis Results 
 The Android Security Bulletin contained hundreds of vulnerability reports from August 
2015 to December 2017. Initially, all software vulnerabilities listed in the bulletin were 
considered. However, after investigating the content of several of the reports, the search space 
was reduced to vulnerabilities which contained links to the Android source code. These were 
generally AOSP specific vulnerabilities, but would sometimes be device specific e.g. on the 
Nexus mobile phones. Vulnerabilities related to external components such as the Linux kernel, 
or Qualcomm drivers either didn’t contain enough information for confident classification, 
weren’t related to events, or were closed source (as in the case with many of the Qualcomm 
component vulnerabilities). For instance, many of the Linux kernel vulnerabilities analyzed early 
on were related to memory or bounds checking issues such as use-after-free, integer overflows, 
etc. It certainly seems that kernel vulnerabilities are much less likely to contain event sequence 
bugs than vulnerabilities that occur at higher levels in the system. One reason for this could 
relate to interactivity, i.e., the more interactive a component, the more likely it is to contain event 
sequences that lead to vulnerabilities.  
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 After analyzing over two years’ worth of Android vulnerabilities, only a small fraction 
were determined to be related to event sequences. While 592 vulnerability reports were analyzed, 
only 49 (approximately 7.9%) were determined to be caused by some sequence of events. 
Although this number appears to be quite small, it is not insignificant. All of the vulnerabilities 
caused by event sequences were rated from “Moderate” to “Critical,” and therefore could be an 
attractive target for attackers. Furthermore, if event sequences aren’t being considered at all 
during testing, it is likely that a significant number of vulnerabilities could exist within the code 
base. As mentioned earlier however, event sequences appear to be more common in interactive 
applications. We wouldn’t necessarily expect to see the same proportion of the Linux kernel 
vulnerabilities be caused by event sequences.  
 The vulnerabilities were analyzed and sorted according to their interaction strength, i.e., 
how many events contributed to fault propagation. Originally, we expected that most 
vulnerabilities would be caused by a higher number of events with fewer caused by a small 
number of events. This hypothesis is opposite to the distribution found in configuration / input 
testing (Figure 2). The idea being that most bugs caused by a single event would be found early 
on in the software development process, since it is likely to turn up in testing without any 
specialized test suites targeted towards events. However, vulnerabilities caused by a much more 
complex sequence of events would be less likely to be discovered during testing, and therefore 
would remain in the code during release. The results of the vulnerability analysis are shown in 
Figure 10 below.  
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Figure 10. Interaction Strength of Event Sequence Bugs In Android Software 
 
 As illustrated in the figure above, the distribution follows that of previous bug analysis 
studies. Contrary to our original hypothesis, the majority of event sequence bugs were caused by 
a single event, with progressively fewer bugs caused by two or more events. This is in direct 
accordance with the interaction rule that makes combinatorial testing so effective. So what is 
likely the cause for so many event sequence bugs being caused by single events? We believe it 
could be due to a number of factors, but the main one being a change in software specifications. 
We will further support this reasoning in the next two sections, however, it should suffice to say 
that as operating systems, APIs, etc. all evolve, it can result in unintended security holes created 
in legacy code. For instance, consider an Android application that was designed and developed 
on Android 5.0, originally meeting all the specifications to run free of issues. After one year the 
application is no longer in active development, and the Android OS has been upgraded to version 
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6.0. With the upgrade to Android, new system events are introduced that were not accounted for 
by the developers of the 3rd party application (as these events were not in the system 
specifications). This change can result in unintended events being performed that were never 
actually tested for during development.  
A higher number of single event vulnerabilities could also be caused by the lack in 
understanding of some external software component. An excellent example of this is the Setup 
Wizard vulnerability CVE-2015-6643, mentioned in chapter 3. The development team working 
on the Setup Wizard were likely unaware that the Google keyboard settings could be accessed by 
holding down the “@” symbol, which led to an unaccounted event in the setup wizard software. 
These single events are never tested during the software development phase since they simply 
are not known about at the time of testing.  
The implications of the distribution obtained highlight the effectiveness that sequence 
covering arrays can have in detecting these types of bugs. With a correct system model, all 
vulnerabilities analyzed in this research could be discovered via a 4-way sequence covering 
array. Additionally, a high number of the vulnerabilities (~90%) could be discovered with a 3-
way sequence covering array, which requires an even smaller number of test cases. We would 
expect that these combinatorial testing methods are used more frequently during testing since 
pseudo exhaustive coverage of sequences can be achieved with such a small number of tests.  
Bypassing the Microsoft Next Lock Screen 
 The Microsoft Next Lock Screen was tested using the system model in chapter 3. A 4-
way sequence covering array was generated based on events a,…,k, using the NIST sequence 
covering array generator tool. From the previous section, we see that a sequence covering array 
of this size will provide sufficient confidence in finding an event sequence bug, if one exists.  
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 The generated sequence covering array contained 72 tests, so running through each 
would take very little effort for a small software development team. Of the 72 tests that were run, 
one critical event sequence bug was discovered. This particular event sequence bug would 
eventually allow for the complete bypass of the PIN code mechanism, compromising the security 
of the entire system. Although a 4-way sequence covering array was used, the event sequence 
bug only had an interaction strength of 2. Therefore, a 2-way sequence covering array (which 
contains only two tests) could have been used instead.  
 The security flaw occurred after the two events openCamera and enterPin. Later we will 
see that the second event can be substituted with any event that transitions back to the home 
screen via the pushing of the “home” button. With any screen lock mechanism in place e.g. PIN 
or pattern, the lock screen could be bypassed by simply opening the camera (either with the soft 
camera button, or a dedicated hardware camera button), and then transitioning back to enter a 
PIN code. It should be apparent by our system model that all of our attacks require physical 
access to the target device. From a hacker’s standpoint this may be less attractive, however, this 
still remains a serious security flaw. Credit card numbers, private messages, photos, and other 
sensitive information are often stored on mobile phones with the only layer of security being a 
lock screen.  
The following steps were used to trigger the event sequence bug which eventually lead to the 
complete bypass of the Microsoft Next Lock Screen. This event sequence bug is present on all 
devices and versions of Android that were used in this research (Sony Xperia Z1, Google Nexus 
6P, and Sony Xperia XZ Premium).  
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1. Open the camera 
2. Press the “home” button to transition back to the lock screen to enterPin 
3. FAILURE  
 
At step 3, the failure occurs for a split second and can easily be missed. When pressing the home 
button to transition back to the lock screen from the camera application, the home screen flashes 
briefly before exiting back out. From a hacker’s point of view, this is a foot in the door. At this 
moment, the goal is seeing what can be achieved in this small window of opportunity.  
The eventual bypass of the lock screen varied depending on what device is being used. 
For example, on the Sony Xperia Z1 running Android 5.1, the attacker can simply open any 
application on the home screen of the device as it flashes briefly. Whichever application is 
opened, the attacker is essentially sandboxed in – attempting to leave the application will result 
in being kicked back out to the lock screen. However, if the attacker chooses the application to 
open carefully, the lock screen can be uninstalled altogether. For instance, if the Google Play 
Store icon is on the home screen (it usually is by default), then this app can be leveraged to 
uninstall the lock screen application via the “uninstall” option within the store.    
On the Sony Xperia XZ Premium running Android 8.0, a different method was needed to 
bypass the lock screen. Attempting to open any application when the home screen flashed 
resulted in being immediately kicked back out to the lock screen. The Google Voice Assistant 
was eventually used as an alternative. When the home screen flashes briefly, if the Google 
microphone icon displayed (again, it usually is by default), then the attacker can quickly activate 
the voice assistant by clicking it. At this point, the attacker is kicked back out to the lock screen 
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with the Google Voice Assistant activated in the background. From here the following steps are 
used: 
1. Make a call via “Call [contact]” voice command 
2. Press the “Settings” icon in the notification pull down of the call dialog 
3. Uninstall Microsoft Next from Settings 
In both methods, uninstalling the Microsoft Next Lock Screen was achieved by the 2-way 
event sequence bug that caused the home screen to flash briefly. Some additional steps were then 
taken to achieve the actual exploitation of the vulnerability. A few important caveats are of 
interest to us. First, the second event that allowed us to find the event sequence bug can be 
substituted by other events that have similar side effects. This goes back to our lazy 
implementation of the system model. By only including independent events and not including 
state transitions, many of the events cause the same transitions to be executed. For instance, 
enterPin and changeWallpaper both require transitioning to the lock screen’s main interface. So 
the sequence openCamera, …, changeWallpaper would have also triggered the event sequence 
bug. Second, notice that event c and d both activate Google Assistant from the lock screen. For 
our event sequence testing, the events c and d never actually triggered a bug and the lock screen 
actually prevented the assistant from launching. Only after triggering the event sequence bug that 
caused the home screen to flash, did the Google Assistant activate. Finally, there are actually a 
few bugs that are caused by other sequences of events, that an SCA would not have likely 
caught. For instance, after discovering that the transition from the phone call to the settings 
screen in the above exploit, another event sequence bug was realized. If the attacker answers any 
incoming phone call from the device, then a simple click of the settings button from the phone 
dialog will bypass the lock screen. However, the SCA would likely not have discovered this 
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vulnerability due to the fact that the events need be adjacent i.e. acceptPhoneCall, 
pressSettingsIcon.  
Bypassing the Super Locker Lock Screen 
 The Super Locker lock screen was tested using a 4-way sequence covering array, 
generated after the model described in chapter 3. Although the Super Locker lock screen is in 
active development and is the more popular choice among lock screen applications, we were 
surprised to discover it contained more event sequence bugs than the Microsoft Next application. 
Two critical event sequence bugs were discovered during testing, each of which leads to an 
eventual bypass of the lock screen. 
 The first event sequence bug occurs after a single event, F (click Advertisement). The 
advertisements that appear in the scrollable window are consistently linked to the Google Play 
Store. Upon clicking one of these advertisements, the Google Play Store application opens 
without any prompt for authentication. If the user attempts to leave the Google Play Store, via 
the home button or some other method, they are kicked back out to the lock screen. However, as 
shown in the previous section, the Super Locker application can simply be uninstalled once the 
Google Play Store is opened, therefore completely bypassing the lock screen. This vulnerability 
was present on the Sony Xperia Z1 (Android 5.1), Google Nexus 6P (Android 7.0), as well as the 
Sony Xperia XZ Premium (Android 8.0).  
 The second event sequence bug was discovered on both Sony devices which are equipped 
with hardware camera buttons. Bug propagation occurs by means of events I and B (emergency 
call and open camera via hardware button).  
1. Open emergency call screen 
2. Push hardware camera button 
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3. Take a picture 
4. Share the picture via Gmail app 
Although this may appear be a 4-way event sequence bug, this is not the case. The fault actually 
occurs on step 2 but is not visible to the user until step 4. First, the application passes control to 
the emergency call activity which is not managed by Super Locker. At step 2, the camera is 
launched via the hardware button. Verification that the fault occurs at this step, can be achieved 
by launching the camera application in any other way – attempting to take and share a picture is 
not permitted (the Super Locker application intercepts the “share picture” action and prompts the 
user for a passcode). However, when launching the camera from the emergency call screen, 
Super Locker is not able to intercept the “share picture” action. We believe this is due to the fact 
that the camera is launched with a different context in this scenario. The Super Locker 
developers likely did not consider the fact that the camera activity could be reached from the 
emergency call screen if the device is equipped with a hardware camera button. Once the Gmail 
app is launched, the Google Play Store can be reached via a chain of actions within the 
application. In the previous exploit examples, we mentioned that once inside the Google Play 
Store, an attacker can uninstall arbitrary user applications from the device.  
  We should turn the discussion towards whether or not a 2-way sequence covering array 
would be sufficient for bug discovery in cases such as these. Would a 2-way sequence covering 
array even be effective at triggering the fault? In our case the 4-way SCA was enough for 
triggering the fault, however, this is not always the case. Notice that for the bug to occur, the 
events openEmergencyCallScreen and pushHardwareCameraButton are required to be adjacent. 
In the definition of sequence covering arrays, t-way event sequences are not required to be 
adjacent, therefore there is no guarantee that this bug would be discovered. Furthermore, it is 
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unlikely that the developers would discover this bug with an SCA even if the events weren’t 
required to be adjacent. As mentioned before, the hardware camera buttons were probably not 
considered while designing the application, therefore it is unlikely that this event would be 
included in their test suite. Even in our situation, we were not immediately aware that a fault had 
occurred. However, during each test we would execute other trivial actions (outside the scope of 
our test suite) to gauge whether or not something changed. For instance, the action sharePicture 
was not included in our test model, but we would often execute the action during each test to see 
if it still behaved the same. The main reason for not including this action in the system model 
itself, was that it is primarily related to the camera application (which is accessible from Super 
Locker), but not directly a part of Super Locker. In this scenario, including sharePicture in our 
system model would have increased our chances of finding the vulnerability.  
Performance of the CSCM Tool 
 The CSCM (Combinatorial Sequence Coverage Measurement) tool is the first tool 
providing t-way sequence coverage measurement that we are aware of. Evaluating the 
performance of CSCM should provide a good benchmark for future tools to improve upon as 
well as gauge the practicality of using this tool in practice.  
 CSCM was developed to run on a single core, as well as with the option to run in parallel. 
Counting the subsequences of every test is a very natural parallel process so it makes sense to 
perform those computations on multiple cores. In Figures 11 and 12, the runtime performance 
between a single core and parallel execution on 7 cores is compared. Note that in Figure 11, the 
runtime is measured in seconds, while Figure 12 measures runtime in minutes. Both sequence 
covering arrays were generated over 26 events, with the 3-way SCA containing 26 tests, and the 
4-way SCA containing 144 tests. The system models in chapter 3 contained less than half the 
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number of events used in this benchmark, so it is expected that this example is much more 
computationally expensive than many real-world scenarios might call for.   
 
 
Figure 11. CSCM Performance on 3-way SCA 
 
 
 
Figure 12. CSCM Performance on 4-way SCA 
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 The CSCM tool is freely available for download via the link in appendix A. In the future, 
the tool will continue to be developed to support other features necessary in real world testing 
environments. For example, the ability to include constraints would be beneficial for system 
models with restrictions on the order of events. For instance, if event a can not be executed 
before event b, then this t-way sequence should not be counted during coverage measurement.  
Implications 
 The distribution of interaction strengths for t-way event sequence bugs provides valuable 
insight into the practicality of discovering these bugs. Out of 592 vulnerability reports, 7.9% of 
the vulnerabilities were caused by some sequence of events. Furthermore, each of these 
vulnerabilities could be detected via a 4-way sequence covering array. In practice, this highlights 
the time and money that can be saved while testing for bugs of this type. Pseudo-exhaustive 
coverage of event sequences can be achieved in very few tests, leaving developers more time to 
test for the other, more common types of bugs. Sequence covering arrays were also very 
effective in discovering bugs in our black-box scenarios, as we were able to find several critical 
vulnerabilities in the two popular 3rd party lock screen applications we tested. If software 
developers continue to leave event sequence bugs in products they release, hackers can 
effectively use these combinatorial methods to exploit the software.    
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK 
  
 This chapter will first summarize the major results of this thesis, highlighting the 
contributions we have made to the cybersecurity field as well as to combinatorial software 
testing research. Then we will discuss the future direction of this work.    
Conclusion 
In this research we explored the effectiveness of using sequence covering arrays in 
testing mobile applications, specifically in black-box environments where little to none is known 
about the internal structure of the system. Sequence covering arrays have been hypothesized to 
be useful in testing interactive systems, but until now, the practicality of such methods was not 
heavily studied.  
First, the distribution of interaction strengths for event sequence bugs was determined via 
vulnerability analysis. The distribution was similar to that of software bugs studied in previous 
research, in that the interaction rule still holds. The majority of event sequence bugs analyzed 
were caused by one or two events, with progressively fewer bugs caused by 3 or 4 events. The 
implications of this finding are that 4-way sequence covering arrays can provide pseudo-
exhaustive testing of event sequences. However, more event sequence bugs should be analyzed 
in future research to further evaluate this finding. Event sequence bugs appear to be much less 
common than ordinary software bugs e.g. those caused by incorrect bounds checking, overflows, 
etc. In our case, only 7.9% of the vulnerabilities analyzed were classified to have been caused by 
event sequences. For this reason, much of our research involved analyzing hundreds of unrelated 
software bugs.  
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Next, we utilized sequence covering arrays in a real world black-box testing scenario. 
Two popular 3rd party lock screen applications on the Android Operating System were tested for 
vulnerabilities. In both cases, the source code was unavailable, and our test suite was generated 
based on external observations of the system. While testing the first application, Microsoft’s 
Next Lock Screen app, we discovered a vulnerability that was triggered with a 2-way sequence 
covering array. Exploitation of this vulnerability allowed us to completely bypass the lock screen 
mechanism, compromising the security of the entire system. Similar results occurred while 
testing the second application, Super Locker lock screen. Using sequence covering arrays we 
were able to find 4 different critical vulnerabilities, each of which led to the eventual bypass of 
the lock screen. The implications of these experiments illustrate that sequence covering arrays 
can be highly effective in triggering critical software bugs in real world scenarios. Furthermore, 
this increases the incentive for software testers to use these combinatorial testing methods before 
releasing the final version of their product. If hackers can effectively use these methods to find 
software bugs without internal knowledge of the source code, then it is essential that these types 
of software bugs be removed early on in the software development phase.   
Lastly, a new software tool was developed for measuring the combinatorial coverage of 
events in test suites. CSCM (Combinatorial Sequence Coverage Measurement) was developed 
using the Haskell programming language and is freely available for download. We believe this 
tool will be useful for measuring the combinatorial coverage of events in existing test suites, 
helping software testers gauge the robustness of their current test setup. For instance, if a testing 
team uses CSCM on their current test suite and deems it to not have adequate coverage, they may 
choose to switch to a sequence covering array. We also believe that this tool will be beneficial 
for comparing various sequence covering array generation algorithms. If two SCA generators are 
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equally fast in producing similar sized covering arrays, CSCM can determine which algorithm 
yields a higher (t+1)-way coverage.  
Future Work 
 The basis for combinatorial software testing rests on the interaction rule i.e. the fact that 
most software bugs appear to be triggered by 6 or fewer inputs or configuration parameters. The 
distribution acquired from this research points to the same phenomenon for event sequence bugs. 
In both cases, more analysis of software bugs will be beneficial. We believe that the future 
direction of this research involves further analysis of event sequence bugs. However, since 
dedicated databases of these types of bugs do not exist, this work is very time consuming. 
Researchers will spend a lot of time analyzing bug reports that are not related to event sequence 
bugs. In our case, we analyzed hundreds of vulnerability reports, however, only 49 were 
eventually classified to be caused by event sequences. There is currently work being done in 
improving vulnerability databases such as the CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration) to a 
more standard “periodic table of bugs [14].” We believe that including event sequence bugs in 
these efforts would be beneficial to the security community.  
 Second, we believe that the developed CSCM tool would be useful in comparing existing 
sequence covering array generation tools. In previous research, many sequence covering array 
algorithms have been proposed [11] [15]. One effective method of comparing algorithms would 
be measuring the (t+k)-way coverage that each provides on identical system models. For 
instance, a generated 3-way SCA that also provides 80% 4-way coverage would be more 
efficient than a 3-way SCA that only provides 40% 4-way coverage.  
 Lastly, we have further interest in using sequence covering arrays in practice. For this 
research, only two 3rd party applications were tested, both of which were lock screens. Using 
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these methods on a more diverse set of software applications would be interesting work for both 
the software testing and hacker communities.  
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APPENDIX 
COMBINATORIAL SEQUENCE COVERAGE MEASUREMENT 
 
This software facilitates measuring the combinatorial coverage of event sequence test 
suites. The software is freely available online and includes a user manual along with several of 
the sequence covering arrays used in this research for evaluating the performance of the tool.  
 The notion of “coverage” refers to the percentage of t-way permutations of events that are 
included in the test suite. A test suite that has 100% t-way coverage will include all t-way 
permutations of events. Furthermore, a test suite that has 100% t-way coverage will also have 
100% (t-1)-way coverage.  
 
Available on GitHub at https://github.com/zachratliff22/CSCM-Tool.git 
 
